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Abstract
Background: Tobacco retailers are potential public health partners for tobacco harm reduction (THR). THR is the
substitution of highly reduced-risk nicotine products, such as smokeless tobacco (ST) or pharmaceutical nicotine,
for cigarettes. The introduction of a Swedish-style ST product, du Maurier snus (dMS) (Imperial Tobacco Canada
Limited), which was marketed as a THR product, provided a unique opportunity to assess retailers’ knowledge. This
study examined retailers’ knowledge of THR and compliance with recommendations regarding tobacco sales to
young adults.
Methods: Male researchers, who may have looked younger than 18 years old, visited 60 stores in Edmonton that
sold dMS. The researchers asked the retailers questions about dMS and its health risks relative to those from other
tobacco products. They also attempted to purchase dMS to ascertain whether retailers would ask for identification
to verify that they were at least 18 years old.
Results: Overall, the retailers were only moderately knowledgeable about THR and the differences between dMS
and other tobacco products. About half of the retailers correctly indicated that snus is safer than cigarettes; half of
whom knew it is safer because it is smoke-free. Fifty percent incorrectly believed that snus causes oral cancer. Less
than fifty percent indicated that dMS differs from chewing tobacco because it is in pouches and is used without
spitting or chewing (making it more promising for THR). Most (90%) of the retailers asked the researchers for
identification when selling dMS.
Conclusion: Tobacco retailers are potentially important sources of information about THR, particularly since there
are restrictions on the promotion of all tobacco products (regardless of the actual health risks) in Canada. This
study found that many retailers in Edmonton do not know the relative health risks of different tobacco products
and are therefore unable to pass on accurate information to smokers.
Background
The availability of accurate tobacco harm reduction
(THR) information at locations where smokers purchase
cigarettes is largely unknown but has great public health
importance. THR, the substitution of lower risk sources
of nicotine for smoking, is a promising intervention for
smokers who will not quit nicotine or tobacco entirely
[1-4]http://tobaccoharmreduction.org. Almost all the
risk from smoking comes from inhaling chemicals pro-
duced during the combustion of organic matter, not
from nicotine or the tobacco plant itself. It is because of
this that non-combustion sources of nicotine, such as
smokeless tobacco (ST) and pharmaceutical nicotine
products cause roughly 1/100
th the risk of life-threaten-
ing disease from cigarettes [5]. Electronic cigarettes
probably have approximately the same mortality risks
(because users do not inhale combustion products) but
have not been studied as extensively. The ability of smo-
kers to make an informed, autonomous choice about
whether to keep smoking, switch to less harmful nico-
tine products, or stop using nicotine entirely, should be
based on accurate information about the products,
including information about the relative health risks of
the different products. Documented misperceptions
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or greater health risks as smoking; ST has been shown
to cause a measurable risk of oral cancer (typically col-
loquially phrased as “ST causes oral cancer”); and the
smoke itself is not the source of most of the health risks
from smoking [6-12]. Accurate knowledge about ST
products is especially important for retailers who inter-
act with customers purchasing tobacco products, and
may prevent or contribute to the propagation of disin-
formation. This is particularly true in Canada because of
the near prohibition on the manufacturers’ ability to
communicate health information to their customers
other than in-person at the point of sale, and restric-
tions on the right to free speech that criminalize even
private provision of accurate information about tobacco
products.
The introduction of a new Swedish-style ST product,
du Maurier snus (dMS), by Imperial Tobacco Canada
Limited (ITC) (a subsidiary of British American
Tobacco) in 2007 provided a unique opportunity to
assess retailers’ knowledge of THR and the sale of ST to
young adults. Snus is the Swedish term for pasteurized
moist snuff that is usually sold in small sachets that
users place between their upper lip and gum and du
Maurier is the brand name of one of ITC’sp r e m i u m
cigarettes. Other ST products (mainly US Smokeless
Tobacco Company’s moist snuff products) were widely
available in Edmonton prior to the launch of this pro-
duct [13,14]. The marketing strategy for dMS differs
from that for other ST products because ITC is market-
ing it explicitly to their and other companies’ cigarette
customers as a harm reduction product. Around the
time of the rollout retailers were educated about the
product category and provided with a brochure, entitled
“What is SNUS” to distribute to adult customers, parti-
cularly those purchasing tobacco products. They also
received oral briefings by sales representatives of ITC
and some of them attended an educational/social event
at the time of the product rollout. The dMS product
displays were quite prominent at the time of the rollout
and data collection [13] before a provincial legal change
mandated that no tobacco products could be visible to
consumers. The display consists of a small refrigerator,
usually located behind or beside the cashier.
Our study examined retailers’ knowledge of the com-
parative risks of different tobacco products and other
health information about ST; information that they
received in oral briefings and written materials about
d M S .I na d d i t i o n ,w et o o ka d v a n t a g eo ft h es t u d yt o
also examine compliance with recommendations regard-
ing the sale of tobacco to young adults. According to
recommendations from Operation I.D., which provides
materials about the sale of tobacco products to youth,
retailers should ask individuals who appear to be under
the age of 25 for identification before selling any
tobacco product [15].
Methods
A list of the 219 retail outlets in the Edmonton area
where dMS was sold at the time of the study was
obtained from ITC. Fifty-two outlets outside of the city
of Edmonton were excluded to simplify the logistics of
data collection so that the study could be completed in
a timely manner. A random sample of 60 of the remain-
ing 167 stores in the city of Edmonton was selected.
Two male undergraduate students (two of the authors
(FT and ZR)), hereafter referred to as researchers, aged
20 and 21 were trained to approach the retailers, ask
questions about THR as part of a conversation about
dMS, and attempt to purchase dMS. The dMS refrigera-
tor was often near the cash register, allowing for a visual
reference to the product. The researchers were greater
than the legal age to purchase tobacco in Alberta but
sufficiently young-looking that they should have trig-
gered the “check identification if under 25” recommen-
dation. No female students were included because males
are much more likely to use ST (e.g., [9,16]), and thus
appeared more natural. The researchers dressed in
casual clothes (e.g., jeans and sweatshirts).
In each store, one researcher approached a cash regis-
ter and asked the nearest employee a series of questions
about the health risks of dMS and THR. The researcher
then purchased one container of dMS, showing his
Alberta driver’s license if he was asked for identification.
As it was crucial for the researchers to appear as normal
customers rather than researchers, they did not follow
the script exactly, but rather rehearsed following natu-
rally flowing conversations and asking their questions at
appropriate opportunities. The researchers completed a
data collection form as soon as possible after leaving
each retail outlet, as doing so inside the store might
have affected the employee’s interactions with the
researcher. The script, data collection form and a de-
identified version of the data are available at http://
tobaccoharmreduction.org/research/retailer.htm
After data collection was completed, the responses to
each question were categorized based on the correct
answers. These categories are described in the discus-
sion section to provide the necessary regulatory and
ideological framework for the retailers’ responses. SAS
(version 9.1, SAS Institute, Cary, North Carolina) was
used for the sample selection and data analysis.
Retailers’ consent was not obtained for this study. Our
goal was to observe the retailers’ behavior during the
course of their normal jobs, and asking for consent
would have prevented this. Asking for consent would
have necessitated limiting the study to an assessment of
the retailers’ responses to what they knew was, in effect,
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whether retailers’ appropriately asked seemingly under-
age customers for identification. The retailers were later
sent a letter and fact sheet describing the study. The
study protocol was reviewed and approved by the
Health Research Ethics Board at the University of
Alberta.
Results
Data collection was completed in February and March
2008. One researcher visited 39 stores, while the other
visited 21 stores. All visits occurred during weekdays
between 9 am and 5 pm. Most of the outlets were con-
venience stores. The researchers did not ask questions
about dMS or THR in two stores where tobacco com-
pany representatives were present. Two retailers refused
to answer any questions about the product and an
additional four, including one who did not appear to
speak English well, did not answer any questions but
gave the researchers the dMS brochure. In one store
there was a handwritten information sheet about snus
on the dMS refrigerator. Retailers’ answers to specific
questions about dMS and THR are illustrated in Figure
1. Relevant information in the dMS brochure and the
four alternating federally mandated warnings that take
up half of the front of the dMS packages are also listed
in Figure 1 to help frame the retailers’ responses.
Is snus safer than smoking?
Only about half of the retailers correctly stated that snus
is safer than smoking. One retailer stated that it is 99%
safer but the rest gave no indication of the magnitude of
the risk difference. Only about half of the retailers who
were aware that snus is safer attributed the risk
Figure 1 Relevant information in the dMS brochure and the four alternating federally mandated warnings that take up half of the
front of the dMS packages.
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lers who did not believe that snus is safer indicated that
it is not safer because it is a tobacco product. An addi-
tional 19% indicated that it is not safer because it causes
oral cancer or mouth diseases.
Does snus cause oral cancer?
Fifty percent of the retailers who were asked and
answered questions about this topic told the researchers
that snus causes oral cancer. Three retailers did indicate
that smoking also causes oral cancer or that snus is less
likely to cause oral cancer than smoking. Many of the
retailers did not respond to this question or were not
asked this question because it could not be raised as
part of an inconspicuous conversation.
Is snus different than chewing tobacco?
Most (73%) of the retailers indicated that snus is differ-
ent than chewing tobacco and many correctly identified
that the differences relate to the use of the product and
not the health risks. Many of the retailers referred to
other moist snuff products, which were available in
most of the stores, as chewing tobacco.
Is snus addictive?
Three-quarters of the retailers believed that snus is
addictive, which is stated in the brochure and one of the
warnings on the package ("This product is highly
addictive.”).
Researchers’ attempts to purchase snus
Snus was purchased in all but three of the stores. Two
of the locations did not have any dMS in stock. A retai-
ler who was speaking with a representative from a com-
pany that markets a competing ST product when the
researcher entered the store claimed that the product
was not available (even though the dMS was clearly visi-
ble to the researcher) and did not sell dMS to the
researcher. A representative from ITC was in one store
where snus was purchased.
Table 1 describes the researchers’ experiences
attempting to purchase dMS in the 58 stores where
tobacco company representatives were not present.
Most (90%) of the retailers asked the researchers for
identification to verify their age. All of the retailers who
did not ask for identification either answered the
researchers’ questions about snus or gave them the bro-
chure. Five retailers who did not ask for identification
sold dMS to the researchers. Thirty-nine percent of the
retailers who asked for identification did so before
answering questions about the product, 41% before the
transaction and 20% during the transaction. In one
store, the retailer initially questioned the validity of the
researcher’s identification but upon follow-up did sell
dMS to him. The researchers were not given the snus
brochure in approximately one-third of the stores (retai-
lers in one-third of these stores said that they had run
out of the brochures).
Discussion
Retailers’ misperceptions were consistent with the con-
fusing and often inaccurate information about ST in the
mandated health warnings, the dMS brochure, popular
press and on the internet. Additional information may
have come from public statements to the community by
our research group, particularly a presentation by one of
us (CVP) at an educational/social event organized by
ITC prior to the product launch. In particular the speci-
f i ce s t i m a t eo f9 9 %r i s kr e d u c t i o na n dt h ef a c tt h a t
smoking is much more likely to cause oral cancer than
snus use are common in our communications but not
ITC’s, and thus most likely trace specifically to us.
Retailers may have a rapport with cigarette customers
who they see frequently and may respond differently to
those individuals. However, it is possible that the
researchers’ experiences may be similar to those of
young smokers who are interested in reduced harm
nicotine products. Many of the retailers were hesitant to
speak with the researchers or did not answer their ques-
tions. Retailers working alone were more likely to
engage in a conversation with the researchers than if
there were other employees or customers in the vicinity.
Obviously, if retailers suspected that the researchers
were “secret shoppers” (underage youths attempting to
purchase tobacco to see if retailers asked them for iden-
tification), their interactions with the researchers might
have been different than with other young adults. We
had no clear indications that this was the case, but it
was possible.
Table 1 Sale of snus to young adults who may appear to
be <18 years old (n = 58)*
n%
Researcher purchased snus
Yes 56 97%
No 2 3%
Retailer asked to see identification
Yes 52 90%
No 6 10%
Researcher received snus brochure
Yes, without requesting it 28 48%
Yes, but had to request it 11 19%
Brochures were placed so customers could take them 1 2%
No 18 31%
* Excludes the two stores where tobacco company representatives were
present. Snus was purchased in one of these stores.
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Retailers’ responses to this question were consistent
with the potentially confusing information about dMS in
the brochure, on the package, in the media at the time
of the product launch [17], and misleading and incorrect
information about ST online [18,19]. The claim that ST
i sn o ts a f eo ri sn o ts a f e rt h a ns m o k i n gi sc o m m o n ,a s
evidenced by the dMS brochure and health warning on
the dMS package. It is clearly confusing to consumers
and it is likely that retailers are no more sophisticated,
mistakenly confusing “not safe” with “not much safer
than cigarettes.”
The common assertion that ST products are not “safe”
is counterproductive. The statement in the dMS bro-
chure that there is “no safe tobacco product” and the
similar health warning are literally true, but highly mis-
leading given how small the risk from ST is compared
to smoking (approximately 1/100
th the mortality risk
[18]). It is not surprising that many retailers did not
know that snus is safer than cigarettes. The brochure
did not make an explicit link between the risk reduction
and the lack of smoke. The attribution of the risk reduc-
tion to things other than the lack of smoke is consistent
with previous research which found that smokers often
a t t r i b u t et h eh e a l t hr i s k so fc i g a r e t t e st ot h i n g so t h e r
than the smoke (such as additives, nicotine, or the other
natural components of tobacco itself) [6-8].
Does snus cause oral cancer?
Although the belief that ST causes oral cancer is a com-
mon misconception, experts agree that the epidemiology
clearly shows that if there is any oral cancer risk from
snus or other modern Western ST products, it is too
small to measure [2,3,20,21]. The majority of cases of
oral cancer in North America are likely attributable to a
combination of smoking and alcohol consumption [22].
Two of the mandated warnings on the dMS package
may have contributed to retailers’ confusion about oral
cancer. ST use does cause superficial irritations in many
users but these lesions are different than those caused
by smoking and very rarely become cancerous [20].
Is snus different than chewing tobacco?
The main differences between snus and chewing
tobacco in terms of usage are that: 1) dMS is in sachets
instead of loose tobacco, making it less messy to use; 2)
while placement is up to the individual, snus is typically
placed between the upper lip and gum (made easier by
the sachet that keeps the product from moving or dis-
bursing), whereas chewing tobacco is typically held in
the lower cheek area and loose snuff is usually used
between the lower lip and gum; and 3) placement under
the upper lip eliminates or minimizes the need to spit.
In addition, it is heat-treated (pasteurized), which snus
manufacturers sometimes claim reduces its health risks
compared to other ST products, a claim that is plausible
but not actually supported by the current evidence [23].
The evidence is not sufficient to distinguish between the
low risks of moist snuff (including snus), chewing
tobacco, and pharmaceutical nicotine products.
Is snus addictive?
The retailers’ beliefs about the snus being addictive are
consistent with the brochure and one of the warnings
on the package. It is true that snus, like all tobacco pro-
ducts, contains nicotine which is considered to be addic-
tive. Thus, it seems reasonable that the retailers should
have answered “yes,” and this is reasonable shorthand
for the accurate observation that many users of nicotine
(from any source) become inveterate users. They would
not be expected to offer nuances or know that “addic-
tion” is not actually well-defined [24,25], that many defi-
nitions of addictive chemicals do not include nicotine
[25] and that nicotine consumption may be beneficial
for some people [25-27].
The sale of snus to young adults who may appear to be
minors
A common argument against THR is the claim that pro-
moting it will increase the chance that ST products will
be used by minors [28,29]. Most studies regarding the
sale of tobacco products to minors focused on cigarettes
[30-33], but there are some claims that retailers may be
more likely to sell ST products to minors [30,34].
Although such claims seem to be of relatively minor
importance (why worry so much about minors getting
low-risk nicotine products given how many of them
choose to and are able to smoke), it is still interesting to
investigate.
Conclusions
The promotion of low-risk nicotine products as an alter-
native to smoking may depend largely on information
provided by retailers. This is the case because the envir-
onment is characterized by manufacturers having lim-
ited opportunities to communicate to customers, there
is limited communication of accurate information from
the scientific community and inaccurate and misleading
information is often issued by anti-tobacco groups and
governmental and non-governmental organizations. Our
study suggests that despite efforts to educate retailers,
they lacked some combination of the time, knowledge,
or analytic sophistication to provide several of the key
bits of information needed to explain the value of THR.
While some retailers provided useful and accurate infor-
mation, many did not. Lack of accurate information
about THR is not surprising given the misinformation
in the popular press[17], and on the internet [18,19]. It
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prising, that retailers who either received directed edu-
cation or could have been educated by other staff
members on the point shared the popular mispercep-
tions. The misleading or unclear warning statements on
ST packages probably contributed to this, and the equi-
vocal claims in the dMS brochure may have also
contributed.
Regulatory changes occurred subsequent to the intro-
duction of dMS (which we detail elsewhere [14]),
including prohibiting the display of snus or informa-
tional brochures. It is unlikely that current customers
would seek information like our researchers did, and if
they did, the printed material would not be available.
Thus, this study is probably more informative for mar-
kets where free speech at point-of-sale is still protected
than it is about the current situation in Edmonton. The
results from this study suggest that retailers in Edmon-
ton may be contributing to public misperceptions about
THR as much as they are reducing them. This suggests
that other restrictions on free speech about THR –
advertising, package inserts, etc. - may be detrimental to
t h ep u b l i ch e a l t h ,s i n c es m o k e r s ’ major remaining
potential source of information is inadequate. The result
is that even where actively providing accurate point-of-
sale information is not criminalized and retailers are
actively encouraged to provide the information, many
smokers who might have quit by switching products will
never learn about this potentially lifesaving option.
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